Certain services may be provided in a continuous, one-dimensional, ordered range of different qualities and a customer requiring a service of quality q can only be offered a quality superior or equal to q. Only a discrete set of different qualities will be offered, and a service provider will provide the same service (of fixed quality b) to all customers requesting qualities of service inferior or equal to b. Assuming all services (of quality b) are priced identically, a monopolist will choose the qualities of service and the prices that maximize profit but, under perfect competition, a service provider will choose the (inferior) quality of service that can be priced at the lowest price. Assuming significant economies of scale, two fundamentally different regimes are possible: either a number of different classes of service are offered (DC regime), or a unique class of service offers an unbounded quality of service (UC regime). The DC regime appears in one of two sub-regimes: one, BDC, in which a finite number of classes is offered, the qualities of service offered are bounded and requests for high-quality services are not met, or UDC in which an infinite number of classes of service are offered and every request is met. The types of the demand curve and of the economies of scale, and not the pace of technological change, determine the regime and the class boundaries. The price structure in the DC regime obeys very general laws.
INTRODUCTION

Background
Consider a delivery service. The quality of the service given may be measured by the delay with which the object is delivered. A service guaranteeing same day delivery is of higher quality than one that guarantees only next day delivery, or delivery within three-business days. Assuming that the service can be provided on a continuous range of qualities, it is typically unrealistic to assume that a service provider could provide all those different services to the customers requiring them or bill them differentially for the qualities requested. In many situations, the service provider will have to decide on certain discrete qualities, i.e., classes of service, and will provide only services of those specific qualities.
The price paid by the different customers depends only on the quality of the service they receive, not on the (inferior) quality they requested and all customers getting the same service pay the same price. We assume that every customer has sharp requirements concerning the quality of service he requests: he will under no circumstances accept a quality that is inferior to his requirements, even if this is much cheaper, and he will, as long as the price is agreeable, use the service of the least quality that is superior or equal to his request. This assumption is not usual, and not in line with [3] for example. Nevertheless, it is very reasonable in connection with Internet services: there is quite a sharp boundary between delays, jitters and latencies that allow for the streaming of video content and those that do not.
We assume significant economies of scale to the service provider: the cost of providing w services grows less than linearly with w, but we also assume that services of different qualities do not aggregate to generate economies of scale: the cost of providing two classes of service is the sum of the costs of those two different services. This is obviously a severe assumption. In practice, a company offering a few different qualities of service will benefit from economies of scale across those different services: administrative services for example will be shared. But if one considers only the cost of moving packets over the Internet and one assumes, in no way a necessary assumption but a definite possibility (see [4] ), that separate sub-networks are affected to the different qualities of service, then the assumption will be satisfied. In the sequel we may therefore assume that a firm provides only a single quality of service: different firms may provide different qualities of service. In deciding what quality or qualities of service to provide, a firm has to avoid two pitfalls: offering a service of poor quality may cater to a share of the market that is too small to be profitable, offering a service of high quality may involve costs that are too high to attract enough customers. A monopoly will set a quality of service and a price that maximize its revenues, but, in a competitive environment, a customer will buy from the provider offering the lowest price for a service whose quality is superior or equal to the quality requested. This will, in general, result in a lower quality of service, a lower price and a higher activity.
Will more than one class of service be proposed? How many? What will the price structure of those classes be? The relation between the traffics in those different classes? Between the revenues gathered in giving those services of different qualities?
Those questions may be asked in many different situations, but they are particularly relevant in connection to the Internet. The Internet delivers packets of information from a source to a destination. The IPv4 protocol, the current protocol for the Internet, reserves three bits in each packet for specifying the quality of service desired, but does not use those bits and treats all packets equally. End users rarely pay per packet and usually pay a flat rate. A number of companies have prepared products for QoS (quality of service), i.e., for controlling an Internet-like network in which packets are treated differentially, but the need for such products is not yet proven. A survey of the different proposals for QoS may be found in [1] . Since the Internet is a loose organization that is the product of cooperation between very diverse bodies, billing for such services would also be a major problem. Many networking experts have therefore claimed that the current fat dumb pipe model is best and argued that it will prevail due to the rapid decline in the cost of equipment. A discussion of the different predictions about the evolution of the Internet may be found in [4] , where a specific proposal, Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) is advocated. Much interesting information about the economics of the Internet is found at [5] . An important aspect of the economy of the Internet is that the prices of the networking equipment are dropping very rapidly. One wonders about the consequences of this rapid decline on the price structure.
Main results
Answers to the questions above are obtained, assuming a one-dimensional ordered continuum of qualities of service, significant economies of scale and a competitive environment. Under some reasonable and quite general assumptions about the demand curve and the cost function, and assuming that a change in price has a similar effect on the demand for all qualities of service, it is shown that one obtains one of two situations.
• (UC regime) If the demand for services of high-quality is strong and the economies of scale are substantive, then a service provider may satisfy requests for service of arbitrary quality: there will be only one class of service catering for everybody's needs; this is the fat dumb pipe model.
• (DC regime) In other cases, a number of classes of service will be proposed and priced according to the quality of the service provided. Very high quality services may not be provided at all.
The DC regime just described may appear in one of two sub-regimes:
• (BDC regime) A finite number of classes of service are offered and services of very high quality are not offered at all.
• (UDC regime) An infinite number of classes and all qualities of service are offered.
Notice that, for example, it cannot be the case that a finite number larger than one of classes are offered and that the highest quality of service caters for unbounded qualities. Significant economies of scale and high demand for high-quality services imply a UC regime, independently of the way prices influence demand. When not in a UC regime, high sensitivity of demand to price implies a BDC regime whereas low sensitivity implies an UDC regime. In a BDC regime, when the basic price of the equipment drops, new classes of service will be offered to the high-end customers that could not be profitably catered for previously. In the UC regime, a slowing of the decline in the price of equipment, does not cause the appearance of multiple classes of service. In a DC regime, a change in the price of equipment cannot cause a transition to a UC regime. A decline in equipment prices, in a DC regime, does not change the boundaries between the different classes of service, but new classes catering to the high-end of the market become available when prices are low enough to make them profitable. The prices drop for all classes, but they drop dramatically for the newly created classes. The ratio of the prices between a class of service and the class just below it decreases and tends to some number typically between 1.5 and 3, depending on the exact shape of the distribution of demand over different qualities and the size of the economies of scale, when prices approach zero. Traffic increases when equipment prices decrease. The direction in which revenues change depends on the circumstances, but, typically, revenues go up and then down when equipment prices decrease. The traffics in neighboring classes of service tend to a fixed ratio when prices approach zero.
PREVIOUS WORK
This work took its initial inspiration in the model proposed by A. Odlyzko in the Appendix to [4] . In [4, 2] , the authors study the case of two different types of customers each type requesting a specific quality of service. They show that, in certain cases, two classes of service will be proposed. The present work assumes a continuous distribution of types of customers. The model of [3] is more detailed than the one presented here and addresses slightly different questions, but its conclusions are supported by the present work.
THE GENERAL PICTURE
In this work the quality of service is characterized by a real number q ≥ 1. A service quality of 1 is the lowest quality available. How does a service of quality q compare with a service of quality 1? The following will serve as a quantitative definition of the quality q of a service:
Quality The cost of providing a service of quality q is the cost of providing q services of quality 1.
We assume significant economies of scale: the cost of providing w services of quality 1 grows like w s for some s, 0 < s < 1: the smaller the value of s, the larger the economies of scale. In [2] one may find a discussion of which s best fits the Internet data: values between 1/2 and 3/4 seem reasonable. The cost of providing w services of quality 1 is therefore:
where c is some positive value that characterizes the price of the equipment. The number c represents the level of the technology, it is a technological constant. Many studies indicate that the price of computer and Internet equipment is decreasing at a rapid pace, probably exponentially. The dynamics of our model is described by a decrease in the value of c.
The cost of providing f (q) services of quality q for every q is:
The second half of our model consists of a demand curve describing the demand for services of quality q at price p. We assume that the demand for such services is described by a density function d(q, p) . The demand for services of quality between a and b > a is:
if the price of any such service is p.
Under a separability assumption:
equilibrium, for providing a service of quality b at price p, is characterized by:
or equivalently by:
where A(a, a ) = a a f (q) dq.
Law 1 (First Law). Whether or not some service is provided does not depend on the function h that describes the way demand depends on price. It depends on the technological constant c, the size of the economies of scale s, and on the function f that describes the distribution of demand over different qualities of service. If some service is provided its quality depends only on s and f , it does not depend on c or h. In the UC regime, a single class serves requests for services of arbitrary quality and it is given for free. In the DC regime, the service of lowest quality has a finite quality and does not cater for high-end customers. The prevailing regime depends on the form of the economies of scale and on the form of the distribution of the demand over different qualities, it does not depend on the price of the equipment or on the way prices influence demand.
Law 2 (Second Law). Under a decrease in the technological constant c, i.e., under technological progress and a drop in the price of equipment:
• In the UC regime, at any time, i.e., for any value of c, a unique class serves requests for arbitrary quality.
• In the DC regime, in the BDC sub-regime, no service is provided at first, then a service of finite quality is provided, later on another service of higher quality will be proposed, and so on. For any quality q a service of quality q will be proposed at some time (and on), but at any time there are qualities of services that are not provided.
in the UDC sub-regime, at any time, an infinite number of classes of service are proposed and requests for arbitrary quality are taken care of.
This Second Law contradicts the folk wisdom that says that the Fat Dumb Pipe (FDP) model for the Internet will collapse when prices become low enough to enable very high quality services. It says that if the FDP model is the one that prevails when c is high, it will continue to prevail after a decrease in c. A drop in the price of equipment cannot cause the breakdown of a system based on a universal class of service.
